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Abstract
We present a model of the evolution of identity via dynamic inter-
action between the choice of education and the transmission of values
in a community from parents to children, when parents care about the
preservation of their traditional community values, di⁄erent from the val-
ues of the host society. We compare the educational and socio-economic
outcomes in di⁄erent scenarios (melting pot versus multiculturalism). If
schooling shifts children￿ s identity away from their parents￿values par-
ents may choose lower levels of education for their children, at the cost
of reducing their future earnings. We show how this e⁄ect can be attenu-
ated and reversed when the school or, indeed, the host society are willing
￿Corresponding author: School of Economics, The University of Reading, P.O. Box 217,
Reading RG6 6AH, United Kingdom. E-mail: m.dellagiusta@reading.ac.uk.
1to accommodate the values of the community and/or to adjust to these
values; otherwise the community gradually becomes alienated. This ap-
proach may be applied to the analysis of temporal changes in values and
attitudes in a community of immigrants, as well as ethnic, religious, or
other minority groups.
Key words: values, education policies, overlapping generations.
JEL classi￿cation numbers: I20, J15, H8
1 Introduction
Immigration has featured as an increasingly important political issue in Euro-
pean debates over the past two decades, and the integration of migrants into
their host societies is a subject raising anxieties both in the recipient countries
and amongst the migrants themselves. In the United Kingdom, nearly three
quarters of teachers (72%) regard the promotion of British values as part of
a teacher￿ s role, with one in ￿ve teachers (21%) seeing this as a central part,
according to YouGov research, commissioned by Teachers TV. This is despite
the fact that the poll, published to coincide with a week of programming dedi-
cated to Britishness and culminating in a debate on the issues, found that there
were a signi￿cant proportion of teachers (36%) who did not identify strongly as
being British.1 When the opportunities o⁄ered to the migrants￿children by the
1Press release of Teachers TV published online (http://www.teachers.tv/node/29223). Re-
search was conducted online by YouGov Plc between 17th and 22nd September 2008. YouGov
interviewed 643 primary and secondary school teachers. Results have not been weighted.
YouGov is a member of the British Polling Council.
2education systems of host countries entail embracing a system of values radi-
cally di⁄erent from their own, it is not uncommon that changes in children￿ s
values under the school￿ s in￿ uence is a source of frustration for parents, causing
tensions not only within the family but also between the community and the
host society. This paper is an attempt to model how the values of the host
society, promoted by the system of education, and the traditional values of a
community of, say, ethnic minority, inculcated within the family, interact in
shaping the identity of the new generation of the community members, and how
this process may evolve and a⁄ect the subsequent generations. In doing so, we
also provide a template to discuss the dynamic interaction between the values
of minority communities and the societies in which they are located.
There exists a large economic literature looking at the social and economic
position of migrants and their children in Europe and North America (for a
comprehensive review see Corak, 2004; and for a recent study of the Canadian
case see Aydemir et al, 2008 and 2009). The common ￿nding is that some socio-
economic outcomes are transmitted from immigrant parents to their children,
though convergence to host society outcomes also occurs over time. For exam-
ple, recently Blau et al (2008), using a sample of second- generation women in
the US, found that their education, labour supply and fertility are signi￿cantly
a⁄ected by those of the immigrant generation. They also ￿nd that whilst after
two generations education and labour supply converge to those of the host pop-
ulation (between 4 and 13 per cent of education and between 3 and 4 per cent
of labour supply shortfall), fertility shows instead more persistence (between 16
3and 42 per cent of excess fertility remains).
Research on the development of ethnic identity by immigrants (Constant et
al., 2009) shows that values are important to the process of creating an ethnic
identity and the latter is then an important determinant of economic behaviour.
Constant and Gataullina de￿ne ethnic identity as ￿ the balance between commit-
ment or self-identi￿cation with the culture and society of origin and commitment
or self-identi￿cation with the host culture and society, achieved by an individual
after migration￿(p.276), and discuss possible outcomes of the process in terms
of assimilation (cultural and social conformity), integration (strong identi￿ca-
tion with ethnic culture and social conformity to host society), marginalisation
(weak cultural identi￿cation and weak social conformity), and separation (strong
identi￿cation to culture of origin and weak involvement in host society). The
study uses the data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 2000-2002 to in-
vestigate the relationship between the ethnic identity outcomes (on the basis of
language use, cultural aspects, ethnic networks, migration history and ethnic
self-identi￿cation) and the individual￿ s current age, age at entry, religion, edu-
cation levels and entry origin for a sample of immigrants from di⁄erent countries
and ￿nds that schooling in the home country overall keeps migrants in￿ exible to-
wards adjustment and creates separation, although immigrants with college and
higher degrees, especially if younger, integrate in the host society better, while
retaining their ties with their ethnic identities. Immigrant parents have con-
sistently been found in the psychological literature to hold on to their cultural
values more strongly than their children, and to have more di¢ culties adapt-
4ing to new cultures and learning new languages: this pattern has been de￿ned
￿ dissonant acculturation￿(Portes, 1997). This a⁄ects both the distance between
immigrant parents￿and their children￿ s values, and the way immigrants shape
their expectations regarding their children: For example, Reese (2001) discusses
the adaptive struggle faced by Mexican immigrants in the United States trying
to raise children who would do well economically but not fall prey to the ￿ moral
dangers￿of the host society. These processes are not uniform across immigrant
communities and depend on a host of factors, including children￿ s gender: Patel
et al (1996), for example, show for the case of Gujarati immigrant families in
the US that parental attitudes and behaviour are a⁄ected di⁄erently by factors
such as modernity, acculturation, and time in the US, depending on parent￿ s and
child￿ s gender. As a part of the International Comparative Studies of Ethno-
cultural Youth (ICSEY) project, Phinney et al (2000) investigated broad value
discrepancies amongst parents and adolescent children in three immigrant (Ar-
menian, Mexican, and Vietnamese) and two non-immigrant groups of families
(African American and European American) in Southern California (an area
with the highest rate of immigration in the US), assessing parents and ado-
lescents independently. The authors maintain that the discrepancy may have
di⁄erent implications for nonimmigrant and immigrant families, and a con￿ ict
may well be more disruptive for the latter. The greatest intergenerational dis-
crepancy exists amongst Vietnamese immigrants, which the authors explain by
the fact that Vietnamese immigrants tend to live in the smallest immigrant
communities. Thus, Vietnamese immigrant adolescents have on average both
5lower levels of ethnic language pro￿ciency and intra-group social interaction,
compared to other ethnic groups (see also Phinney et al 2001). In the European
context, Drbohlav and DzœrovÆ (2007), using Berry￿ s acculturation strategies
model and Portes and Zhou￿ s (1993) segmented assimilation model, discuss the
mode of inclusion into Czech society of immigrant groups and its relation to
their level of satisfaction of the immigrants with their new lives. Their ￿ndings
suggest that the immigrants￿inclusion in Czech society in Prague has developed
into speci￿c modes: Ukrainians are typical of their speci￿c transnationalization
patterns, Vietnamese represent a well-o⁄ but separated and segregated commu-
nity, and Armenians practice a clear assimilation strategy, while approaching
the mainstream in terms of socio-economic status. The immigrants most satis-
￿ed with their quality of life are those for whom it is not important to live close
to their compatriots and those whose knowledge of the spoken Czech language
is above average. The least satis￿ed are those who prefer to live close to their
compatriots, those with university education, and those with a low income.
These and similar ￿ndings in the socio-economic literature provide an evi-
dence of a process of values transmission across generations, in￿ uenced by the
values of the host society and mediated by various policy channels addressing
social inclusion. In this paper we concentrate on the e⁄ect of education; in
particular, the mitigation of the degree of conformity with school norms by the
conformity with community norms (a re￿ ection of the ethnic and social mix of
the neighbourhood of residence).
The importance of both family and school for the development of values is
6well documented in economic and sociological literature. Akerlof and Kranton
(2002) address the role of school norms and students￿background in determin-
ing educational outcomes, given the amount of resources devoted to education.
In their model the e⁄ectiveness of resources depends on the interaction be-
tween resources used and student formation of academic identity. The basis for
their model is found in the sociological literature which suggests that student
motivation may derive from ethnic background (which also in￿ uences levels of
school funding) and match with the school. Conversely, positive developmental
outcome from cross-racial and cross-ethnic friendships at school have emerged
from empirical studies in developmental psychology (see Kawabata and Crick,
2008), and the in￿ uence of school rules, particularly relational ones, on chil-
dren￿ s values is well documented in the educational literature (see Thornberg,
2008). Ho⁄mann and Dufur (2008) use the data from the 1990 National Ed-
ucational Longitudinal Study and the 1994￿ 1995 National Longitudinal Study
of Adolescent Health to support the claim that family environment and school-
based social environment may serve as substitute or complementary forms of
capital in forming the behaviour of students, in particular, youth delinquency.
Social norms and values have long featured in explanations of individual
and group behaviour by economists, from the early work on social norms and
conformism by Akerlof1(980) and Jones (1984) to the recent contribution on
status by Besley and Ghatak (2008), among others. At the same time, the role
of identity in individual welfare and decision-making has only relatively recently
featured in economic models. Our approach falls within the tradition of the
7economics of social norms and identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) in which
norms act as motivating devices and the inherent sociability of humans creates a
loss of utility from not conforming with the prevailing norms. In our model the
frame of reference for each generation are the norms of their parents and those
of the host society. The key assumption in our model of two-way interaction of
values between a minority community and the host society are based on studies
of education and transmission of values in the minority communities conducted
in psychology, sociology and economics. In this paper we aim to address policy
issues related to education, immigration and social inclusion.
We focus on the interaction between the values of the community and the
host society through the system of education, while explicitly considering how
speci￿c policy parameters can a⁄ect the degree of assimilation of individuals in
their society, as well as the degree of integration between immigrant (or minor-
ity) and host society. This gives an additional, policy angle to our approach
and distinguishes our model from a number of positive studies, in the spirit of
Bisin and Verdier (2001). For example, in Saez-Marti and Sjogren (2008) the
evolution of values follows a probabilistic rule and is a⁄ected by peers as well as
the parents. In a similar probabilistic framework, Corneo and Jeanne (2009a,b)
explore the endogenous emergence of tolerance in a heterogenous society; they
also analyze how the evolution of values a⁄ects the economic growth and de-
velopment through the occupational choice. The di⁄erence between their and
our approaches is also in the source of the alternative values; we believe that
indoctrination through the schooling system is no less important than informal
8peer pressure, and furthermore, if much of the interaction with peers occurs
within school, the policies of the latter with regards to the diversity and related
issues can have a strong in￿ uence upon the attitudes of the peers. Dasgupta
and Kanbur (2005, 2007) consider a similar interaction between the values of
two co-existing communities. In their framework values are modelled as a lo-
cal public good, with members of the community a⁄ecting them directly by
choosing their contributions towards its provision. In our model the behaviour
of agents a⁄ects the values indirectly, through the choice of education. The
decision problem here is intertemporal, and this allows, in line with Akerlof￿ s
work on endogenous social norms (Akerlof, 1980), to derive the dynamic path
of the endogenous change in values over time, which has not been done in the
literature before, to the best of our knowledge. In addition to processes a⁄ecting
intergenerational value transmission in a minority community (migrants, ethnic
or religius groups), we model the forces governing the assimilation of their values
by the host society, and show how convergence of values can be achieved.
Our theoretical analysis describes how values change across generations when
children￿ s values are shaped both by their families and their schooling, so that
the norms of reference for each new generation are di⁄erent from those of the
previous one. To our knowledge, there is no longitudinal dataset currently
available which would provide su¢ cient amount of data on individual and socio-
economic characteristics of migrants, to test the empirical implications of the
model (see Joshi, 2008 for the representation of ethnic minority groups in UK
cohort studies). Examples of rich datasets on immigrants are ICSEY mentioned
9above, and the current TIES study. The former is a multi-country survey of
immigrant parents and their adolescent children. The latter is a comparative
research project on the descendants of immigrants from Turkey, the former
Yugoslavia and Morocco who live across eight European countries: Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland,
surveying second generation immigrants aged 18-35. Whilst these projects pro-
vide a large number of interesting details they give only a one-time snapshot.
Thus, testing for an empirical evidence of the intertemporal interaction between
schooling and the values transmission is necessarily limited. Nevertheless, the
results of the numerical simulations of the model are qualitatively consistent
with the observed patterns, even though it was not possible to calibrate the
model for the lack of the proper data.
In the next section we present our model and characterize the equilibrium.
Section 3 presents the results of numerical simulations. In Section 4 we discuss
some policy implications and conlude.
2 The Model
Consider a community of families whose traditional values di⁄er from the values
of the society outside the community, or the external values. This can be a com-
munity of immigrants, a religious minority, etc. To analyze the dynamics of the
changes in the traditional values when the new generations are exposed to the
external values, in particular, through schooling, we use a two-period overlap-
10ping generations model. There is no population growth. A community member
of generation t is an adult born in period t ￿ 1; from now on they are referred
to as ￿ agent t￿ . In the ￿rst period of life each individual receives education in
the amount chosen by their parent. In the second period each individual works
and divides their earnings between consumption and investment in education of
their o⁄spring (there is no bequests). The education system is maintained by
the host society and performs two roles, an academic and a social one. Firstly,
it enhances a student￿ s skills and, therefore, increases his or her future labour
earnings. Secondly, it promotes the values of the host society and, therefore,
a⁄ects the identity of a student. Parents care about their o⁄springs￿future
wealth, as well as about preserving traditional values of the community. In par-
ticular, they dislike their children￿ s values deviating from the values currently
prevailing in the community.
We assume that the values of an agent t are summarized by a one-dimensional
parameter, ￿t. In period t the values of the community are the average of the
values of all adult members of this community. Note that ￿ can be thought of as
an aggregate of a number of factors, e.g. respect for elderly, status of women in
the family, tolerance to pre-marital relationships, religiosity, etc., ￿rather than
a measure of strength of any such particular custom or institution, ￿such that
the di⁄erence in ￿ between two generations (or between two societies) re￿ ects
how one perceives oneself di⁄erent from the other.
The preferences of agent t are described by the following utility function:







11we impose the standard assumptions: u0;v0;g0 > 0, u00;v00 > 0, and g00 > 0.
Here xt is agent t￿ s level of consumption, wt+1 is the wealth (here equal to
the labour earnings), of agent t￿ s o⁄spring, i.e. that of an individual born and
educated in period t; and ￿t+1 is the o⁄spring￿ s future identity (their position






is the (squared) distance
between the future generation￿ s values and the current community values. We
assume g (0) = 0 and g > 0 everywhere else. The magnitude of ￿t+1 depends on
the amount of education received by the child, et, as well as the parent￿ s values,
￿t, and the values prevailing in the host society and promoted by the schooling
system, ￿
H
t . We model ￿t+1 as a weighted sum of ￿t and ￿
H
t :
￿t+1 = [1 ￿ ￿(et)]￿t + ￿(et)￿
H
t : (1)
We make the following assumption on the weighting function, ￿(et):
￿(0) = 0; ￿
0 (0) > 0;￿
00 (￿) ￿ 0:
Thus, when community members are not exposed to education outside the com-
munity their values do not change (this assumption is consistent with ￿ndings
from longitudinal studies of immigrant children￿ s values discussed in our litera-
ture review). Moreover, we allow for the e⁄ect of the host society￿ s values chang-
ing non-monotonically with education; in particular, it may take an inverted-U
shape, ￿in line with ￿ndings in the developmental psychology and education
literature, this means that primary schooling strongly instills the host society
values, whilst higher education promotes the development of a critical outlook
and to re-evalution of personal attitudes and values.
12The optimization problem of agent t is to maximize their utility, Ut, by
choosing their consumption level and the amount of education for their o⁄spring,
subject to the budget constraint,
wt ￿ w(et￿1) ￿ xt + c(et);
where wealth w and cost of education c are such that
w(0) > 0; w0 > 0; w00 ￿ 0; c(0) = 0; c0 > 0; c00 > 0:
In the optimum the budget constraint holds with equality. Using this to elimi-




Ut = u(wt ￿ c(et)) + v (w(et)) ￿ g
￿h





The state variable is et￿1, the level of education of agent t, which also determines
her position on the scale of values, ￿t, and her wealth, wt. The derivative of the
objective function with respect to et is
U0









If the interior solution (et > 0) for the optimization problem exists, it satis￿es
U0
t = 0:


























This condition states that in the interior optimum marginal bene￿t from educa-
tion (returns to education in terms of labour earnings) equals its marginal cost,
13comprised of the physical cost of education and the disutility from the change
in the o⁄spring￿ s values caused by education. When marginal cost exceeds mar-
ginal bene￿ts for et ￿ 0 the optimal choice of education is zero.
In a homogenous community, when all the agents in generation zero have
identical values and preferences, ￿
C
t = ￿t, the evolution of the values in the
community is described by the following system of di⁄erence equations:
￿
C





















If the interior solution for the second equation is unique and ￿
H
t evolves inde-
pendently of ￿t (or, indeed, ￿
C
t ), the path for ￿t (and for et) will be uniquely
determined by two initial conditions, say, e0 and ￿0.
For the process in ￿
H
t we consider two scenarios. In the ￿rst scenario ￿
H
t is
exogenously ￿xed: the host society, or its core values promoted by its educational
system are not in￿ uenced by the community nor do they change over time. In
the second scenario ￿
H





















where f is a continuous and twice di⁄erentiable function, with f (0) = 0, f0 (0) <
0; and f00 (0) > 0. This intends to decribe a situation when the community is
in￿ uential, perhaps, because of its large size, so that its values a⁄ect the values
of the host society.
142.1 Steady state: separation, assimilation and melting pots.
We de￿ne the steady state in this economy as the one characterized by the con-
stant level of education across the generations in the same family, and constant
values of the community. In particular, a steady state with et = 0 for all t ￿ 0
may exist if ￿
H
t = const: (the host society is not willing to adjust to the com-
munity) and the optimal choice of education in every period is zero, because at
time zero the marginal cost of education exceeds it marginal bene￿ts,
v0w0 (e￿)










This may occur when (i) education is prohibitively expensive, or (ii) the returns
to education are low, or (iii) the weight parents put on their children￿ s wellbeing
is low, or (iv) the parents￿dislike for the change in children￿ s values is strong, or
(v) when the e⁄ect of schooling on children￿ s values at lower levels of education
is strong, or (vi) when the values of the community and those of the host society
di⁄er widely. If this is the case, then all the subsequent choices of et are also
optimally set to zero: the community falls in a low-skill or even a poverty trap,
and the distance between the values of the community and the host society does
not change. Note that all the conditions described above are indeed typically
present in the case of the separated communities described by Constant et al
(2009).
A steady state with et = b e > 0 may also exist; this, however, implies equal-
ization of the values of the community and of the host society are the same:
￿
H
t (b e) = ￿
C
t (b e) = b ￿ = const:
15The corresponding level of education solves
v0w0 (b e) = u0c0 (b e): (2)
This equation may have more than one solution, and di⁄erent solutions can have
di⁄erent local and global stability properties. Note that this equation does not
contain f and ￿, and therefore the level of b e is independent of the process of
adjustment. However, the location of common values b ￿ achieved in the steady
state, depends on how fast the the community￿ s and the host society￿ s values
change, and therefore does depend upon f and ￿.
If there are multiple steady states they are characterized by di⁄erent levels
of education that can be attained by a given dynasty. These can be Pareto
ranked. De￿ne the welfare of a given dynasty in a steady state as the level of
utility achieved by a member of this dynasty. In the steady state it equals
W (b e) = u(w(b e) ￿ c(b e)) + v (w(b e)):
Di⁄erentiation with respect to b e gives
W0 (b e) = u0 (w(b e) ￿ c(b e))[w0 (b e) ￿ c0 (b e)] + v0 (w(b e))w0 (b e)
= u0 (w(b e) ￿ c(b e))w0 (b e) > 0:
Thus, the steady state in which every dynasty has higher education attainment
strictly Pareto dominates the one with the lower attainment. This will not
necessarily be the case when there is heterogeneity in preferences or in the level
of education of generation zero, although one could argue that the latter may
have lesser role.
162.2 Dynamic path and intermediate scenarios.
In order to proceed with the analysis of the dynamic path of the economy we
need to adopt speci￿c functional forms. From now on we assume the following:














z2; w(e) = w0 exp(￿ ￿ e);




where a;b;p;q;r;￿;￿ are non-negative constants.
Parameter q in the utility function measures the importance of community
values for its adult members. In the analysis this is assumed to be constant
across individuals, however in the simulations we allow this parameter to vary
(in particular, by assuming that each family is characterized by its own value of
q, drawn randomly from a uniform distribution). Parameter a in the weighting
function ￿ captures the leverage of primary education on values (thus smaller
magnitudes of a correspond to higher segregation), whilst parameter b repre-
sents how fast the e⁄ect of school norms on students￿values weakens at higher
levels of education, so that a higher magnitude of b re￿ ects a poorer ￿t of stu-
dents with the school norms. This implies that given a level of education, an
individual will develop values closer to the community if the leverage of primary
education on values is small and they are further from school norms (as per Ak-
erlof and Kranton, 2002), whilst they will develop values closer to those of the
host society values if the leverage of primary education on values is large (in line
with Phinney et al, 2000, and the ICSEY project ￿ndings) and they ￿t better
17with school norms (as in Goldin and Katz, 1997; and Alesina et al, 1999).
With these functional forms the evolution of the economy is described by
the following system of equations,
￿t+1 =
￿









































et = maxf0;e eg
where e e solves
￿￿ =
r + p ￿ e e
w0 exp(￿ ￿ et￿1) ￿ r ￿ e e ￿ p ￿ e e2=2
+q
￿￿
































There is a possibility, observed in the simulation, that the realized dynamic
path of the host society values is non-monotone: the host society may have
a tendency to distant itself from the community at ￿rst, and gradually be-
come more tolerant and start making steps towards integration, which it can
do through schools that are willing to adjust to the diverse student body. The
values can also diverge; the outcome depends on the initial values, as well as
the parameters of the model. Note that the evolution of ￿
H


























































describes a partial adjustment at a diminishing rate or divergence at an in-
creasing rate. Below we refer to the situation with c = d = 0 as the ￿ static
case￿ .
One can see that in this economy the steady state with et = e0 = 0 may
exist in the static case, when the preferences are such that ￿ is small (parents
put low weight on their children￿ s welfare) or q is large (the parents￿discontent
with the change in children￿ s values is strong). It is also likely to happen when
￿ is small (low returns to education), r and/or p are large (the physical cost of
education is high), or a is large (the e⁄ect of elementary schooling on children￿ s
values is strong), or when (￿
H
0 ￿ ￿0) is large (the initial gap between the values
of the community and those of the host society is wide).
The situation with adjustment is fundamentally di⁄erent from the static
case. Given the same con￿guration of parameters, when the school, or, indeed,
the host society, particularly through an inclusive schooling policy, is willing to
adjust its values toward the community, it is possible that the gap between their





































With the su¢ cient reduction in the distance between the values, and therefore
the su¢ cient reduction in the ￿ marginal discontent￿ , it may become optimal for
19the new generation of parents to choose e1 > 0. In the next period the gap will




0 due to e1 > 0, which in turn induces
higher e2, and so forth. The process of convergence may, however, reverse, in
particular, if the e⁄ectiveness of indoctrination at school weakens signi￿cantly
at higher levels of education (b is su¢ ciently large relative to a). Thus, the
outcome depends on both the schooling e⁄ect and the degree of in￿ uence of the
community.
We now brie￿ y analyze the existence of the steady state and the welfare
implications of multiplicity of the steady states for this economy, assuming that
the community members have identical preferences, so that ￿
C
t = ￿t. Using the
chosen functional forms we can rewrite (2) as
v0 (w(b e))
u0 (w(b e) ￿ c(b e))
w0 (b e) = c0 (b e);
or













where b e is the steady state level of education. Both sides of the equation are
strictly increasing and convex in b e. It is easy to see three di⁄erent cases are
possible:























































of less interest.) In case (iii) the two steady states are characterized by di⁄erent
levels of education.
Local stability properties of a given steady state are determined by the mag-























r + pb e
￿
;
where the last equality follows from (3). The steady state is locally stable
when this quantity is between zero and one; for this to be the case ￿ has to be
su¢ ciently large, and ￿ su¢ ciently small; not much more can be said since the
analytical form for the solution does not exist, although one can argue that if
there are two steady states with b e > 0 then the one with lower b e is likely to be
locally stable, while if the steady state with b e > 0 is unique then it is locally
stable. (see Appendix for the details).
3 Simulation results
In this section we present the results of simulations of our model with heteroge-
nous community (q drawn from a uniform distribution2) for di⁄erent combi-
nations of the magnitudes of the model parameters, which we use to discuss
2We also ran simulations for a heterogenous community with di⁄erent levels of education
in the ￿rst generation, drawn from a uniform distribution. The results di⁄er only in levels,
while the shapes of the paths are essentially the same.
21alternative outcomes with respect to integration, as well as how these can be
in￿ uenced by policies. On the graphs below we plot the choice of education, the
resulting shifts in the values of the community (blue lines) and the host society
(red lines) over time, and the path of welfare. Our simulations for various con-
￿gurations of parameter values appear to result robustly in a number of di⁄erent
scenarios, some of which are illustrated in the ￿gures below, as the most inter-
esting representative cases. In all simulations presented in this section we use
w0 = 1; ￿ = 0:25, p = 0:2; r = 0:1; ￿
H
0 = 3; ￿
C
0 = 1; e0 = 0; ￿ = 0:75; c = 0:1.
The ￿rst set of ￿gures represents simulations for E [q] = 0:1, while in the second
set E [q] = 0:5 so the average disutility from the future deviation of chidren￿ s
value from the parents￿values is higher in the second case. It is obvious that
when the community is more conservative, parent￿ s choice of education for their
child is substantially lower, compared to the ￿rst case, and so the values in the
community do not change much over time. In addition, the ￿rst set of ￿gures
illustrates two di⁄erent values of a parameter describing the community, while
the second set does so for a parameter describing the host society.
In Figure 3 two cases are plotted for comparison. The solid curves correspond
to a = 1=3 and b = 9=5, and the dashed curves correspond to a = 1=3 and
b = 2=3; in both cases c = 0:1 and d = 0:5. The choice of education is higher in
the second case, but the di⁄erence between the two cases is relatively small. The
shifts in the values, however, are very di⁄erent: in the ￿rst case, characterized by
a higher b, or a poorer ￿t with school norms, the values of the community and the
host society diverge, while in the second case the gap between values shrinks over
22time. Thus, the ￿rst situation describes a community of well-educated minority
(say, ethnic or religious) that is immune to the e⁄ects of the ouside culture and
is not willing to integrate into the host society; this attitude makes the initial
trend in the host values towards the community to reverse. As the community
is alienated from the host society, the latter distances itself from the community
even more. In the second case, when the e⁄ect of schooling diminishes slowly,
the gradual shift of the community values towards the host society is met by
the reciprocal shift in the host society values; the gap eventually shrinks: the
two cultures ￿embrace each other￿ . The welfare of the community is higher in
the second case, primarily because of the smaller loss of utility due to the more






























23Figure 3 was obtained for c = 0:1;d = 0:5 (solid lines) and for c = 0:1;d =
0:25 (dashed lines). A higher value for the parameter d in the ￿rst case means
that the host society is less willing to accommodate the community when the
di⁄erence in values is large, compared to the ￿rst case with lower d. (In both
cases we used a = 4=3 and b = 2=3, so that the e⁄ect of schooling does not
diminish very much as the amount of education increases.)
One can see that in the ￿rst case the distance between the community and the
host society increases over time, while education remains at a rather low level.
Because now the disutility from changing values is relatively low, the community
moves towards the host society, however, at the same time the society moves
away. This describes, say, a low-skilled ethnic minority, trying to imitate and
become integrated into the host culture, while the schooling system, or, indeed,
the host society continues to emphasize the di⁄erence and maintains, or even
increases, the distance from the community. In the second case the host society
adjusts to the community, and both the educational outcomes and welfare are
strikingly higher, ￿ the latter not only due to the higher earnings, but also
because with the adjusting host society its values, instilled in children through
schooling, are now closer to the community values and so do not cause discontent
to the parents. This describes the situation when the willingness of the host
society to embrace the values of the minority is reinforced by the willingness of
the minority to adjust.
Thus, through a simple representation of the relationship between values
and education our model generates a variety of di⁄erent scenarios of cultural
24integration or segregation of minority groups characterised by di⁄erent patterns
of human capital accumulation and welfare. The outcomes for the community






























parameters high d, low q high d, high q low d, high q
high b high-skill, reclusive high-skill, integrated high-skill, reclusive
low b high-skill, integrated low-skill, rejected high-skill, integrated
4 Discussion and conclusions
Our paper presents a model of values transmission across generations and com-
munites and of the e⁄ect that di⁄erent education and integration policies can
25have on minorities￿welfare, as well as on cultural integration. Using numerical
simulations, we compared educational and socio-economic outcomes in di⁄erent
scenarios generated by the di⁄erent relative importance attributed by parents
to their tradional values and to their children￿ s education, as well as by the
di⁄erent policy parameters, particularly regarding the school norms. In our
simluations we chose a parameterisation that allows us to focus on social and
educational policy options. For example, given parental incomes, values and
preferences, a society comprised of segregated communities may need to put
particular e⁄orts in the short run into inclusive schools, in order to dampen the
e⁄ect of exisiting segregation. We ￿nd that the initial heterogeneity in education
and in preferences (the relative weight attributed to the preservation of values)
in our framework does not matter for their corresponding dynamic paths: all
families with di⁄erent education level of generation 0 rapidly converge to the
same path, as do those with di⁄erent weights on the preservation of values. We
also ￿nd that when the values of the community move towards those of the
host society the welfare of the community is higher if the host society adjusts.
In our framework there is a direct e⁄ect of higher levels education on welfare,
through higher income, as well as an indirect e⁄ect, through moderation of the
changes in community values, resulting in the mitigation of the parents￿discon-
tent and attenuation of an inter-generational con￿ ict. On the other hand, our
results support the view that alienation, or divergence of values, can occur if
schools attempt to impose homogeneity and achieve complete conformity of the
migrants with the external values. Thus, the dangers of indoctrination call for
26attention to school policies, particularly in relation to their attitude to cultural
diversity.
Policies to reduce segregation within schools and communities appear to be
e⁄ective in raising the educational attainment of immigrants￿children in the long
run (for a discussion of the role of insitutional and social capital in migrants￿
integration and well-being see Della Giusta and Kambhampati, 2006). The
model simulations also allow to explore the e⁄ects of policy variables on the
persistency of community values: these adjust and eventually converge to the
external values only if the segregation is relatively low and students￿￿t with
the school norms is relatively high; an empirical study by Balu et al. (2008) of
the second-generation immigrant fertility in the United States shows that even
in this case it takes considerable time before convergence in values takes place.
Whilst our model remains necessarily simple vis-a-vis the complex reality of
minority communities, it allows to describe the key features of the evolution of
individual identity and their e⁄ect on broader community outcomes, in terms
of both education and welfare, as well as social inclusion. Our framework pro-
vides a tool for the analysis of the process of interaction between the individual
identity and social values, and for the assessment of the relative e⁄ectiveness of
di⁄erent existing schooling and inclusion policies. We hope that our results will
inform policy debates on the modes of social inclusion and academic discussions
on identity and its importance for the socio-economic outcomes.
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A Local stability of the steady state
















r + pb e
￿
< 1;
where b e solves (3). This condition can be rewritten as
￿p￿2b e2 ￿ 2￿(2￿p ￿ p ￿ r￿)b e + 2r￿(1 ￿ 2￿) < 0: (4)
The discriminant of the quadratic polynomial in b e in (4) is
D = 4￿2 ￿￿
r2￿2 + 4p2￿
￿
2 ￿ 4￿p2 + p2￿
> 0;
since the quadratic polynomial in ￿ in square brackets has a negative discrim-
inant, ￿(2rp￿)
2. Therefore, the polynomial in (4) has two real-valued roots,
32and the inequality in (4) holds for b e 2 (e￿;e+), where
e￿ =
￿ (2p ￿ r￿) ￿ p ￿
q
(r2￿2 + 4p2)￿
2 ￿ 4￿p2 + p2
￿p￿
:
Two steady states are possible if both e￿ and e+ are positive (case 1), and only
one steady state is possible if e￿ is negative and e+ is positive (case 2). If the
con￿guration of parameters is such that for e0 = 0 the optimal choice is e1 > 0
(which is the situation we are interested in) then in case 1 the lower b e is between
e￿ and e+, and the higher b e is above e+, so the lower steady state is locally
stable. Similarly, in case 2 the unique b e is below e+, and so the unique steady
state is locally stable.
33